for a system with a one per million failure rate, the life of a CB in a general aviation aircraft flying forty hours per year is adequately safe. "safer" isn't measurable in a meaningful way at that point.
So that's not how SSAs work. The analysis is of the whole SYSTEM. And in GA aircraft, we're generally shooting for a SYSTEM level catastrophic failure rate of less than 1 per 1M hours. So either each component of the system that has a failure rate of < 1/1M hours needs redundant backup, or the failure rate of the component needs to substantially better than 1/1M hours. Having performed the SSA on the WK2, SS2 and RM2 aircraft for Scaled Composites, I'm intimately familiar with how to determine safety levels using aerospace standard procedures and practices.
So the electrical SYSTEM needs to catastophically fail < 1/1M hours. If there are 10 CBs in the system which control safety of flight components, and each has an independent failure rate of 2 * 10e-6, that's a total failure rate of 20 * 10e-6 - 20X the allowable failure rate. 10 fuses, however, would be right at the allowable catastrophic failure rate. Could be better, for sure, but 20X better is still 20X, and one meets the requirements (barely) and the other doesn't.
The safety of a fuse would be greatly offset by the impractical requirement to inspect the status of every single fuse through those tiny cloudy plastic windows before every flight.
You're fixating on the inspection of the CBs/fuses - that's not where safety comes from. In a well designed system, nothing needs to be inspected - the quality is built in. I have a COZY MKIV with dual Dynon HDX screens. In my plane, there are approximately 50 fuses in separate fuse buses. If a fuse has popped, I will immediately know it because a warning/error message will appear indicating that something isn't working. During the pre-flight, I operate all systems that do not have a warning message, and if they work, I know all the circuit protection devices are not popped. There is no single component, protected by its own fuse, that if INOP, prevents the airplane from being flown safely to some destination where the failure can be debugged on the ground - NOT in the air. There is never a nuisance pop as there are with CBs, and I NEVER reset a CB/fuse in the air, as a popped fuse is an indication that the airplane is trying to set itself on fire, and I generally choose not to give the plane a 2nd chance to set itself on fire if I can avoid it (which, due to the architecture of my electrical system, I ALWAYS can).
There is no reason to inspect, much less see or touch, the fuses in flight or in the pre-flight - other methodologies tell me that everything is working before takeoff.
i get it though, you like fuses, not trying to change your mind, just learning through an interesting discussion
It is interesting - getting past "this is the way we do it here" and OWT in the aviation industry is difficult. Regulation makes change difficult, and the general lack of capability in designing for safety, quality, reliability and maintenance in the GA (and E-AB) world gives non-design engineers a poor view of what good design practices entail and require.
So what have you learned?